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Abstract
Given the violence in Darfur and the ensuing international reaction, the Fordham International
Law Journal decided to publish a special issue on Darfur. It is timely in light of the continuing
violence in the Darfur region. This article serves as the Introduction to the special issue.
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The International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (the
"Commission") was established by United Nations ("U.N.") Sec-
retary-General Kofi Annan in October 2004.' The Commission
reported to the U.N. in January 2005 that there was reason to
believe that crimes against humanity and war crimes had been
committed in Darfur and recommended that the situation be
referred to the International Criminal Court ("ICC").2 On
March 31, 2005, the Security Council referred the situation in
Darfur to the International Criminal Court.3 The Prosecutor re-
ceived the document archive of the International Commission of
Inquiry on Darfur. Over the months that followed, the Prosecu-
tor investigated the situation in Darfur and on June 6, 2005, he
concluded that the statutory requirements for initiating an inves-
tigation were satisfied. On April 27, 2007, the ICC issued war-
rants of arrest against Ahmad Muhammad Harun and Ali
Muhammad al Abd-Al-Rahman ("Ali Kushayb").4 Neither of the
arrest warrants has been executed.
Notwithstanding the referral of the situation by the Security
Council, the government of Sudan has refused to recognize the
jurisdiction of the ICC or cooperate with the investigation in any
way.5 Not only is the government of Sudan protecting the two
* Richard J. Goldstone is a former Justice of the Constitutional Court of South
Africa and Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
1. See S.C. Res. 1564, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1564 (Sept: 18, 2004) (requesting Secre-
tary-General to establish an international commission of inquiry into situation in Dar-
fur); Press Release, Secretary-General, Secretary-General Establishes International Com-
mission of Inquiry for Darfur, U.N. Doc. SG/A/890 (Oct. 7, 2004); Letter from Secre-
tary-General to President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2004/812 (Oct. 11,
2004) (setting out structure and purpose of international commission of inquiry).
2. International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, Report of the International Com-
mission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General, (Jan 25, 2005) (prepared
by Antonio Cassese).
3. See S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005).
4. Warrant of Arrest for Ali Muhammed Ali Abd-AI Rahman, ICC-02/05-01/07-3
(Apr. 27, 2007); Warrant of Arrest for Ahmad Muhammad Harun, ICC-02/05-01/07-2
(Apr. 27, 2002).
5. See Editorial, Delay, Obstruction and Darfur, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2007, at A22;
Marlise Simons, 2 Face Trials at The Hague Over Atrocities in Darfur, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28,
2007, at A3.
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persons whose arrest is being sought, but Harun has been pro-
moted to a more senior position in the Cabinet of President
Omar Hassan al-Bashir of Sudan.6 More recently, one of the
leadingJanjaweed warlords, Musa Hilal, has been appointed as a
leading officer in the Sudanese Security Services.7
Politically, the government of Sudan is in a position to
thwart the will of the Security Council for a number of reasons.
The first is the support it receives from China. Sudan is an oil
producer and its most important customer is China.8 The Chi-
nese have threatened to veto any serious Security Council action
against Sudan and have succeeded in watering down resolutions
proposed by the Western members of the Council.9
The second reason is the ambivalence of the United States.
In July 2004, both chambers of the U.S. Congress adopted con-
current resolutions condemning the continuing atrocities in the
Darfur region of western Sudan as "genocide" and asking the
international community to join with the United States to help
bring an end to the humanitarian catastrophe that is under way
there.' 0 In September 2004, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell
also stated on behalf of the Administration that the killings in
Darfur constituted genocide.11 The legal basis for the conclu-
sion that genocide has indeed been committed in Sudan is pro-
vided in a thorough and careful analysis by Jennifer Trahan, a
leading New York civil liberties attorney, author and teacher.12
On the other hand, the present U.S. Administration is not a
6. See Delay, Obstruction and Darfur, supra note 5; Simons, supra note 5.
7. See Sabrina Tavernise, Sudan Leader Rebuffs Critics Over Choice of Advisor, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan 22, 2008, at A3.
8. See F. William Engdahl, Darfur: Forget Genocide, There's Oil, AstA TIMES ONLINE,
May 25, 2007, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/sudan/2007/
0525forget.htm (describing scope of China's investment in Sudan's oil sector).
9. See Patrick Goodenough, China Accused of Prolonging Sudan Bloodshed Because of
Oil, CNSNEWS.coM, Apr. 11, 2006, http://www.cnsnews.com/ViewForeignBureaus.asp?
Page=/ForeignBureaus/archive/200604/INT20060411c.html (taking note of criticism
that China's support for Sudanese government in Khartoum has prevented Security
Council from taking measures that could bring end to violence in Sudan); Kristina
Nwazota, China-Sudan Trade Relations Complicate Darfur Crisis, ONLINE NEwsHOUR, Apr.
25, 2006, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/china-darfur 04-25-06.html.
10. H.R. Con. Res. 467, 108th Cong. (2004); S. Con. Res. 133, 108th Cong. (2004).
11. The Crisis in Darfur, Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Commit-
tee, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 9, 2004) (statement of Secretary Colin L. Powell), available
at http://www.state.gov/secretary/forrier/powell/remarks/36042.htm.
12. Jennifer Trahan, Why the Killing in Darfur is Genocide, 31 FoRDHAm INT'L L.J. 990
(2008).
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supporter of the ICC and is not prepared to give it any assis-
tance." Of importance, it has been unprepared to place any
pressure on Sudan to execute the arrest warrants for Harun and
Kushayb. The Court is entirely dependant on government sup-
port for the implementation of its orders and requests, and the
absence of pressure from the United States is critical. In the
meantime the killings and ethnic cleansing in Sudan continues.
Against that background, the Fordham International Law Jour-
nal decided to publish this special issue on Darfur. It is timely in
light of the continuing violence in the Darfur region.
The question of state responsibility for genocide was re-
cently the subject of a judgment of the International Court of
Justice in the case of Bosnia v. Serbia.14 The findings made by the
Court are relevant to the analysis of the crimes committed in
Darfur and they are the subject of two thoughtful analyses by
Professor Ademola Abass15 and Senior Trial Attorney in the In-
ternational Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia's Office
of the Prosecutor, Dermot Groome.' 6
I have already referred to the role played by China. In this
context, the article by Mr. Chin-Hao Huang is of particular im-
portance. Mr. Chin-Hao provides details of the Chinese eco-
nomic interests in Sudan. He makes the point that Sudan's con-
tribution to China's total energy needs "is important but not
strategic" and that "Sudan accounts for five to seven percent of
China's total oil imports, and less than one percent of China's
total energy consumption."17 I would suggest, however, that hav-
ing regard to China's growing consumption of oil, it would not
be easy for it to find a substitute supplier. And, the projected
decline of Sudan's oil production over the next decade does not
13. See Nicholas D. Kristof, Op-Ed., Why Should We Shield the Killers?, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 2, 2005, at A21.
14. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.) (Judgment of Feb. 26, 2007),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf (last visited Apr. 29,
2008).
15. Ademola Abbass, Proving State Responsibility for Genocide: The ICJ in Bosnia v.
Herzegovina and the International Commission of Inquiry for Darfur, 31 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
871 (2008).
16. Dermot Groome, Adjudicating Genocide: Is the International Court ofJustice Capa-
ble of Judging State Criminal Responsibility?, 31 FoRDAM INTr'L L.J. 911 (2008).
17. Chin-Hao Huang, U.S.-China Relations and Darfur, 31 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 829
(2008).
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reduce the present usefulness of this present supplier of oil. At
the same time, Mr. Chin-Hao draws attention to the fact that
China is Sudan's largest export market and biggest source of for-
eign investment. He states further that "[a]ggregate sunken in-
vestestment as of late 2005 stood at an estimated US$15 billion,
making China the largest foreign investor in Sudan.""8 He also
points out that it is estimated that 8100 Chinese are employed in
Sudan.19 It is clear that Sudan plays a central role in the cur-
rently expanding Chinese Africa policy. The Chinese base their
policy with regard to Darfur on the "principle of non-interfer-
ence." Mr. Chin-Hao's conclusion is that Chinese policy in this
regard is not inflexible and that Washington should be more un-
derstanding of the "subtleties behind China's evolving perspec-
tive.20
The contribution by Mr. Chin-Hao sets the context for an
impressive note by Russell P. McAleavey on an oil-for-food pro-
gram for Sudan.2' His starting point is an Op-Ed I published in
the International Herald Tribune on June 13, 2007 calling for such
a program.22 The idea is that Sudan should be prevented by
such a program from using any proceeds from its oil sales for the
purchase of military equipment. Mr. McAleavey's conclusion is
that notwithstanding the maladministration of the U.N.'s Oil-for-
Food Program in Iraq, it "was successful in achieving two of its
main aims: preventing Saddam Hussein from reviving Iraq's de-
velopment of weapons of mass destruction and improving the
standard of living for the civilians of Iraq."23 The appeal of such
a program is that it would in no way impede oil sales to China or
any other purchaser. Mr. McAleavey's conclusion is that "such a
program could be the step that finally forces Khartoum to coop-
erate with the international community. '24 I need hardly say
that I fully agree.
Finally, there are two essays that highlight the important
contributions that have been made by non-governmental organi-
18. Id. at 830.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 842.
21. Russell P. McAleavey, Note, Pressuring Sudan: The Prospects for an Oil-for-Food
Program for Darfur, 31 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 1058 (2008).
22. Richard Goldstone, An "Oil-for-Food" Program for Darfur, INT'L HERALD TRIB.,
June 13, 2007, at 4.
23. McAleavey, supra note 21, at 1095.
24. Id. at 1096.
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zations. Genevieve Cox, a San Francisco litigator, and Jerome C.
Roth describe the important perspective of Sudanese human
rights lawyers who participated in the Darfur Legal Training Pro-
gram.25 A training session was held in London under the aus-
pices of the American Bar Association's Litigation Section, with
funding from the MacArthur Foundation. 26 These Sudanese
lawyers had never traveled outside of Africa and had little con-
tact with international human rights law or training in trial advo-
cacy skills. The Program allowed them to meet and interact not
only with American lawyers, but also a former International
Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia prosecutor, a federal judge,
and representatives from the ICC.
Colin Thomas-Jensen and Julia Spiegel describe the impres-
sive movement that has arisen in the United: States and around
the world in response to the violence in the Darfur region of
Sudan and the extent to which they have helped mould public
opinion and pressured some governments to take stronger ac-
tion against Khartoum.27
Finally, this issue contains a photo essay by Olivier Bercault
of Human Rights Watch. 2' This is yet another illustration of the
powerful message that photographs can portray.
In the end, the response of the global community and espe-
cially the powerful members of the U.N. has been a tremendous
disappointment. One would have hoped that the abject failure
to protect the people of Rwanda would have driven the members
of the U.N. to adopt strong measures in the face of the dreadful
crimes committed and being committed against innocent chil-
dren, women and men in Darfur. If that still does not happen,
more untold thousands of people will be slaughtered and many
more driven from their homes. The ball is very much in the
court of the powerful global players. If the political will can be
mustered the slaughter can be stopped.
25. Genevieve Cox &Jerome C. Roth, SeekingJustice for Victims in Darfur: The Darfur
Legal Training Program, 31 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 816 (2008).
26. See id.
27. Colin Thomas-Jensen & Julia Spiegel, Activism and Darfur: Slowly Driving Policy
Change, 31 FoRDHAm INT'L L.J. 843 (2008).
28. Olivier Bercault, Photo Essay, The Crisis in Darfur, 31 FoRDHAm INrr'L L.J. 859
(2008).
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